Many cooperative games, especially ones stemming from resource pooling in<br/>queuing or inventory systems, are based on situations in which each player is associated with a single attribute (a real number representing, say, a demand) and in which the cost to optimally serve any sum of attributes is...

Limit core allocations are the ones that remain in the core of a replicated economy.An equivalent notion for economies with public goods is Schweizer s concept of club e ciency under a variable number of economic agents.We extend this notion to economies with goods that have a semi-public...

In this paper we axiomatically characterize two recursive procedures for defining a social group.The first procedure starts with the set of all individuals who define themselves as members of the social group, while the starting point of the second procedure is the set of all individuals who are...

Impersonal exchange has been a major driver of economic development. But transactors with no stake in maintaining an ongoing relationship have little incentive to honor deals. Therefore, all economies have developed institutions to support honest trade and realize the gains of impersonal...

Recent work by Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) considers the problem of group identification from a social choice perspective.These authors provide an axiomatic characterization of a liberal aggregator whereby the group consist of those and only those individuals each of which views oneself a...

This paper analyzes the compromise social choice correspondence derived from the F-value of digraph games.Among other things monotonicity of this correspondence is shown

Limit core allocations are the ones that remain in the core of a replicated economy. An equivalent notion for economies with public goods is Schweizer's club efficiency. We extend this notion to economies with goods that have a semi-public nature. The notion encompasses purely private as well as...

We consider the problem of ranking sets of objects, the members of which are mutually compatible.Assuming that each object is either good or bad, we axiomatically characterize three cardinality-based rules which arise naturally in this dichotomous setting.They are what we call the symmetric...