We study markets with two types of agents. Sellers have an indivisible good for sale, and their reservation value is zero. Buyers are randomly matched with sellers, and they value the good at unity. Sellers may be matched with any positive number of buyers, and they may choose to determine the...

We examine the role of seller bidding and reserve prices in an infinitely repeated independent-private-value (IPV) ascending-price auction.The seller has a single object that she values at zero.At the end of any auction round, she may either sell to the highest bidder or pass-in the object and...

We study an economy where a collection of indivisible goods are sold to a set of buyers who want to buy at most one good.We characterize the set of Walrasian equilibrium price vectors in such an economy using sets of overdemanded and underdemanded goods.Further, we give characterizations for the...

This paper investigates the prices and the returns in the market for modern Russian art, a prime example of an ‘emerging art market’, over the last four decades. After applying a hedonic regression model on an extensive dataset containing 52,154 sales by 410 Russian artists, we show that the...