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The Consensus Value for Games in Partition Function Form
Ju, Y. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2004
consensus value is discussed.Finally, two applications of the consensus value are given: one is for oligopoly games in partition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091966
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The Trust Game Behind the Veil of Ignorance : A Note on Gender Differences
Vyrastekova, J.; Onderstal, A.M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2005
We analyse gender differences in the trust game in a "behind the veil of ignorance" design.This method yields strategies that are consistent with actions observed in the classical trust game experiments.We observe that, on averge, men and women do not differ in "trust", and that women are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090864
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Lying About What you Know or About What you Do? (replaces CentER DP 2010-033)
van Damme, Eric; Potters, Jan; Serra Garcia, M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2011
We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one- shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091836
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Signaling Without Common Prior : An Experiment
Müller, Wieland; Drouvelis, M.; Possajennikov, A. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2009
The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a common prior in a two-person signaling game. For a specific probability distribution of the sender’s type, the long-run behavior...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091889
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Which Words Bond? An Experiment on Signaling in a Public Good Game (replaced by CentER DP 2011-139)
van Damme, Eric; Potters, Jan; Serra Garcia, M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2010
We compare signaling by words and actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing, can signal by contributing first (actions) or by sending a costless message (words). Words can be about the return or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092715
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Collusion and the Political Differentiation of Newspapers
Filistrucchi, Lapo; Antonielli, M. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2012
two forms of collusion: in the first, publishers cooperatively select both prices and political position; in the second …, publishers cooperatively select prices only. We show that collusion on prices reinforces the tendency towards a Pensée Unique … discussed in Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (2001), while collusion on both prices and the political line would tend to mitigate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091765
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Predation Under Perfect Information
Argenton, Cédric - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 2010
In an oligopoly configuration characterized by high barriers to (re-)entry, a finite horizon, perfect information about …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011092518
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Evolutionary Selection of Behavioral Rules in a Cournot Model : A Local Bifurcation Analysis
Droste, E.J.R.; Tuinstra, J. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1998
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011090553
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Non-Linear Asset Valuation on Markets with Frictions
De Waegenaere, Anja; Kast, R.; Lapied, A. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1996
This paper provides a non-linear pricing rule for the valuation of assets on financial markets with intermediaries.The non-linearity arises from the fact that dealers charge a price for their intermediation between buyer and seller. The pricing rule we propose is an alternative for the wellknown...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091055
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Indirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation : A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions
Dufwenberg, M.; Güth, W. - Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research - 1997
The two major methods of explaining economic institutions, namely by strategic choices or by (indirect) evolution, are compared for the case of a homogenous quadratic duopoly market. Sellers either can provide incentives for their agents to care for sales (amounts) or evolve as sellers who care...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011091056