Abstract: This paper models expectation formation by taking into account that agents produce heterogeneous expectations due to model uncertainty, informational frictions and different capacities for processing information. We show that there are two general classes of steady states within this...

In rational, efficiently functioning and complete markets, returns on derivative and underlying securities should be perfectly contemporaneously correlated.Due to market imperfections, one of these markets may reflect information faster.The use of high-frequency data and the choice for a small...

This paper adds to the literature dealing with the effect of derivatives trading on underlying securities by examining option listings from the Netherlands. The effects on both stock returns and volatility are investigated using three types of samples, namely, listing of call options alone,...

Since 1998, large investment banks have flooded the European capital markets with issues of call warrants.This has led to a unique situation in the Netherlands, where now call warrants, traded on the stock exchange, and long-term call options, traded on the options exchange, exist.Both entitle...

We compare signaling by words and actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing, can signal by contributing first (actions) or by sending a costless message (words). Words can be about the return or...

We study the economic role of banks’ soft information, which evolved from repeated lending relationships, in the context of loan default. Using a proprietary database from one of the largest state-owned commercial banks in China, we find that the bank’s internal credit rating scores play a...

In repeated games with differential information on one side, the labelling "general case" refers to games in which the action of the informed player is not known to the uninformed, who can only observe a signal which is the random outcome of his and his opponent's action. Here we consider the...

We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one- shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her...

Incentivicing doctors to take the costs of treatment into account in their prescription decision could lead to lower health care expenditures and higher welfare. This paper shows that also the opposite effects can result. The reason is a misalignment of doctor and patient incentives: Because of...