In a seminal paper, Ariel Rubinstein has shown that impatience implies determinateness of the 2-person bargaining problem. In this note we show that this result depends also on the assumption that the set of alternatives is a continuum. If the pie can be divided only in finitely many different...

We use the approach of the reduced Game Property and its converse to characterize the sets of stable and semistable demand vectors. It is shown that although these two concepts are generally very different their axiomatizations are almost the same. Regarding the semistable demand vector we...

In the present paper we discuss the notion of values for games with coalition structure, applying the approach suggested by Hart and Mas-Colell (1985) concerning the consistency property and the potential function. An axiomatic formulation of the values by this approach leads to two known values...

The multilinear extension has been shown to be an effective tool for computing the Shapley value of an n-person game. We modify here the method of the multilinear extension to calculate the modified (coalition) value for such games.