According to Porter’s hypothesis, environmental regulation increases the regulated firms’ profits. However, if a “greener” strategy is more profitable why does it need regulatory intervention in order to be implemented? Let a greener product increase the adopter’s marginal cost while...

When a vertically integrated firm competes against non integrated rivals in the input and the final-good markets, the layman's belief is that, when the non-integrated downstream firms purchase part of their input from the up- stream division of the integrated firm, the downstream division will...

In a vertically differentiated market with cost asymmetries, the risk dominance criterion selects the equilibrium where the high quality is produced by the efficient firm. We show that a sufficiently high MinimumQuality Standard reverses equilibrium selection. Hence, MQS may be used in order to...

We examine the interaction between financial and microeconomic decisions in a differentiated duopoly under uncertainty as to consumer taste for quality. Financing is by equity and debt and product specification is endogenous. We consider two three-stage games, according to the order of moves:...

When the market of tradable emissions permits is perfectly competitive, free allocation of permits through some discretionary rules corresponds to lump sum transfers and cannot have strategic effects. This conclusion is reversed when transactions costs are introduced in the TEP market....

We examine the interaction between financial and microeconomic decisions in a differentiated duopoly where additional willingness-to-pay for high quality is uncertain. Product specification is endogenous. We consider two three-stage games, according to the order of moves: qualities-financial...