Since Sen's contribution on the impossibility of a Paretian liberal, his formulation of libertarian rights has been under debate. In this paper, we highlight some important strands in this debate, and achieve some conceptual clarification of the different and often incompatible views of...

Conditions α and β are two well-known rationality conditions in the theory of rational choice. This paper examines the implications of weaker versions of these two rationality conditions in the context of solutions to nonconvex bargaining problems. It is shown that, together with the standard...

Two features of Arrow's social choice theory are critically scrutinized. The first feature is the welfarist-consequentialism, which not only bases social judgements about right or wrong actions on the assessment of their consequences, but also assesses consequences in terms of people's welfare...

We reconsider the three well-known solutions: the Nash, the egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, to the classical domains of convex bargaining problems. A new proof for the Nash solution that highlights the crucial role the axiom Contraction Independence plays is provided. We also...

By allowing for the possibility that individuals recognize the intrinsic value of choice along with the instrumental value thereof, we suppose that individuals express extended preference orderings of the following type: Choosing an outcome x from an opportunity set A is better than choosing an...

Conditions α and β are two well-known rationality conditions in the theory of rational choice. This paper examines the implication of weaker versions of these two rationality conditions in the context of solutions to non-convex bargaining problems. It is shown that, together with the standard...