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I examine how a firm’s opportunity to verify information influences the joint use of verifiable and unverifiable information for incentive contracting. I employ a simple two-period agency model, in which contract frictions arise from limited liability and the potential unverifiability of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011140982
Earlier studies show that contracts under subjective performance evaluation are dichotomous and punish only worst performance. I show that with limited liability payments need not be binary. More importantly, if the agent earns a rent from limited liability, the optimal contract distinguishes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011140995
This paper studies sabotage in a dynamic tournament. Three players compete in two rounds. In the final round, a player who is leading in the race, but not yet beyond the reach of his competitors, gets sabotaged more heavily. As a consequence, if players are at the same position initially, they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005026613
This paper investigates the role of variance analysis procedures in aligning objectives under the condition of distorted performance measurement. A riskneutral agency with linear contracts is analyzed, whereby the agent receives postcontract, pre-decision information on his productivity. If the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005739659
We consider a situation where an agent's effort is monitored by a supervisor who cares for the agent's well being. This is modeled by incorporating the agent's utility into the utility function of the supervisor. The first best solution can be implemented even if the supervisor's preferences are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005739701
This paper analyzes the use of alternative performance measures in an agency model in which contracting incorporates both formal and informal agreements. It is shown that under a proper use of verifiable and unverifiable performance measures, the two types of contracts are complements,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005614496
Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on the trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empirical puzzle on the positive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785785
In this paper, I compare two different approaches to model implicit contracting, the infinite-horizon approach typically used in the literature and afinite-horizon approach building on an adverse-selection model. I demonstrate that even the most convincing result of the infinite-horizon...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785797
Tournaments have been objected as resulting from ad hoc restrictions to the contracting problem which are not easily justified. Taking into account that a performance measure might not be verifiable to a third party, however, a restriction to payments which sum up to a constant may be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785798
We consider a double-sided moral hazard problem where each party can renege on the signed contract since there does not exist any verifiable performance signal. It is shown that ex-post litigation can restore incentives of the agent. Moreover, when the litigation can be settled by the parties...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785810