Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 82
Cover Image
The Evolutionary Stability of Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance
Schipper, Burkhard C. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
We provide an evolutionary foundation to evidence that in some situations humans maintain optimistic or pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty and are ignorant to relevant aspects of the environment. Players in strategic games face Knightian uncertainty about opponents’ actions and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785794
Cover Image
Gambling in Contests
Seel, Christian; Strack, Philipp - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
This paper presents a strategic model of risk-taking behavior in contests. Formally, we analyze an n-player winner-take-all contest in which each player decides when to stop a privately observed Brownian Motion with drift. A player whose process reaches zero has to stop. The player with the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010556735
Cover Image
Courtesy and Idleness: Gender Differences in Team Work and Team Competition
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kübler, Dorothea - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
Does gender play a role in the context of team work? Our results based on a real-effort experiment suggest that performance depends on the composition of the team. We find that female and male performance differ most in mixed teams with revenue sharing between the team members, as men put in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785908
Cover Image
Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot Oligopoly
Schipper, Burkhard C. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
We analyze a symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round a l`a Vega-Redondo (1997). Optimizers play a myopic best response to the opponents’ previous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785827
Cover Image
Ambiguity and Social Interaction
Eichberger, Jürgen; Kelsey, David; Schipper, Burkhard C. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785837
Cover Image
Imitation - Theory and Experimental Evidence
Apestgeguia, Jose; Huck, Steffen; Oechssler, Jörg - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
increasing in payoff differences. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785850
Cover Image
Rage Against the Machines: How Subjects Learn to Play Against Computers
Dürsch, Peter; Kolb, Albert; Oechssler, Jörg; … - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2005
We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005785934
Cover Image
Signaling in Auctions among Competitors
Scarpatetti, Benedikt von; Wasser, Cédric - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
We consider a model of oligopolistic firms that have private information about their cost structure. Prior to competing in the market a competitive advantage, i.e., a cost reducing technology, is allocated to a subset of the firms by means of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008501955
Cover Image
Breakdowns
Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
We study a continuous-time game of strategic experimentation in which the players try to assess the failure rate of some new equipment or technology. Breakdowns occur at the jump times of a Poisson process whose unknown intensity is either high or low. In marked contrast to existing models, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010860230
Cover Image
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games
Hörner, Johannes; Klein, Nicolas; Rady, Sven - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
allowing for punishments and rewards: the best and worst equilibrium payoff are explicitly solved for. Second, they capture … behavior of the discrete-time game: as the period length goes to zero in the discretized game, the SSE payoff set converges to … their solution. Third, they encompass a large payoff set: there is no perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the discrete-time game …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010904041