The paper proves that in two-player logit form symmetric contestswith concave success function, commitment to a particular strategydoes not increase a player's payo, while in contests with more thantwo players it does. The paper also provides a contest-like game inwhich commitment does not...

This paper shows that technology licensing may be socially undesirable. Possibility of licensing increases the incentive for entry and thus, increases competition. If technology of the incumbent and entrant is sufficiently close, licensing-induced entry reduces social welfare. Otherwise,...

In a vertically separated industry, where the input suppliers have significantmarket power, not only entry but also the markets (upstream or downstream) withentry possibilities might be a concern to the policy makers. While ‘entry in thedownstream market only’ always increases welfare,...

This paper shows that the possibility of licensing can significantly alter theeffects of entry on social welfare. We find that while licensing with output royaltyalways raises welfare due to entry, licensing with up-front fixed-fee reduces thepossibility of lower welfare compared to a situation...

Noncooperative games in which each player’s payo¤ function depends on anadditively separable function of every player’s choice variable may be transformedinto an aggregative game, which may be analysed using the conceptof ‘share functions’. The resulting approach avoids the...

The aim of this paper is to analyze the hypotheses of German dominanceand asymmetry in the European Monetary System (EMS).Weuse monthly data for British, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Spanishand US interest rates from January 1979 to the second half of 1997. Inparticular, we test the stability...

This note develops a method of recovering individual preferences, and of obtaining money-metricindividual welfare comparisons, from demand functions generated by Cournot-Nash equilibria ingames with public goods.

We examine the implications of an income redistribution from men to women for the welfare ofmothers and their children. We develop a Cournot model of a two-person household whereagents provide market labor and allocate their spending between a private consumption good andgoods for children. We...