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Monitoring and enforcement of environmental regulations. Lessons from a natural field experiment in Norway
Telle, Kjetil - 2012
Relying on a small natural field experiment with random assignment of treatments, I estimate effects of three core elements of most monitoring and enforcement practices: self-reporting, audit frequency and specific deterrence. I find evidence of evasive reporting of violations in self-audits, as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011968450
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A survey-based choice experiment on coca cultivation
Ibanez, Marcela; Carlsson, Fredrik - 2009
From 1997 to 2005, an astonishing 5,200 million USD was invested to reduce cocaine production in Colombia, the world … programs. Our results support Becker's (1968) model of crime participation and in addition shed light on other non …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010329930
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Who crops coca and why? The case of Colombian farmers
Ibáñez, Marcela - 2010
Approximately 1.2% of Colombia's GNP is spent every year on the war on drugs, but very little is known about coca … of land to use for its cultivation, we develop an extended version of the portfolio model of crime that considers the … with coca and non-coca farmers living in Putumayo, Colombia. We find that farmers react to economic incentives and hence …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010329967
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Is the war on drugs working? Examining the Colombian case using micro data
Ibanez, Marcela - 2013
living in a coca growing area in Colombia. We find that while eradication and alternative development decrease coca supply …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010330028
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Initiation into crime: An analysis of Norwegian register data on five birth cohorts
Galloway, Taryn Ann; Pudney, Stephen - 2011
characteristics and history up to age 15; and (for males) IQ test scores. A longitudinal analysis of the risk of initiation into crime …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011968425
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Priorities in the location of multiple public facilities
Bochet, Olivier; Gordon, Sidartha - 2008
A collective decision problem is described by a set of agents, a profile of single-peaked preferences over the real line and a number k of public facilities to be located. We consider public facilities that do not suffer from congestion and are non-excludable. We provide a characterization of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316052
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Cooperation preferences and framing effects
Dariel, Aurélie - 2013
This paper presents the results from an experiment investigating whether framing affects the elicitation and predictive power of preferences for cooperation, i.e., the willingness to cooperate with others. Cooperation preferences are elicited in three treatments using the method of Fischbacher,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316058
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Sustainable climate treaties
Gersbach, Hans; Hummel, Noemi; Winkler, Ralph - 2011
We examine a global refunding scheme for mitigating climate change. Countries pay an initial fee into a global fund that is invested in long-run assets. In each period, part of the fund is distributed among the participating countries in relation to the emission reductions they have achieved in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316065
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Political influence on non-cooperative international climate policy
Habla, Wolfgang; Winkler, Ralph - 2011
We analyze non-cooperative international climate policy in a setting of political competition by national interest groups. In the first stage, countries decide whether to set up an international emission permits market, which only forms if it is supported by all countries. In the second stage,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010316075
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Separation of Powers, Political Competition and Efficient Provision of Public Goods
Boukouras, Aristotelis; Koufopoulos, Kostas - 2011
In this paper we provide a political game where agents decide whether to become legislators or politicians. Legislators determine the political institutions constraining politicians\' behavior and politicians compete for gaining the power to make decisions about the level of the public good. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010329997