Cet article vise à décomposer les principaux mécanismes économiques sur lesquels s’appuie le développement des réseaux sociaux et des sites contributifs du Web 2.0. La gratuité d’usage, érigée en norme sur Internet, nous y apparaîtra comme la composante partielle d’un système de...

Aujourd’hui, n’importe quel contenu informationnel se résume à une suite de 0 et de 1, que l’on peut transmettre de manière indistincte sur le réseau à destination de n’importe quel utilisateur doté d’un réceptacle quasi universel. La diffusion de l’information a donc changé...

We consider a dual labor market with a continuum of heterogeneous workers differentiated by their ability of acquiring a specific training. In the primary sector, jobs require specific training and firms set efficiency wages. In the secondary sector, wages are competitive and no training is...

Classical models of Industrial organization are examined, placing emphasis on pricing patterns in response to exogenous shocks. Different reasons for prices to be rigid are presented and explanations for apparently erratic behaviour of prices are provided.

Strategic models of product differentiation are applied to the labour market. In a first model we investigate the case of imperfect competition among workers facing an heterogenous labour demand ; the second model illustrates imperfect competition among firms that are heterogenous with respect...

In this paper, we explore a simple model which focuses on the joint role of workers' heterogeneity and imperfect competition in the endogeneous formation of labor market equilibria. We show that, compared to the competitive case, imperfect competition leads to a misallocation of workers and to...

When consumers differ in their attitude towards risk, price competition between products of uncertain characteristics may be analyzed using address-models of product differentiation. These models provide a natural set-up for analyzing industries in which products of different reliability may...

We consider a game in which firms' owners assign to their managers a delegation scheme weighting profits and market shares. Managers then compete in quantities. We show first that this delegation scheme typically leads to quantities being strategic substitutes or complements depending on firms'...

We consider the two-stage game proposed by Kreps and Scheinkman (83) in the address-model of horizontal differentiation developed by Hotelling. Firms choose capacities in the first stage and then compete in prices. We show that price competition is drastically softened since in almost all...

A labour market is modelled where two firms, differentiated by their technologies are competing in wages to attract workers endowed with specific qualification level. We show how worker’s willingness to acquire qualification and firms’ ability to set wages explain wages differential at the...