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Heifetz, Aviad; Kets, Willemien - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2012

This paper constructs a type space that contains all types with a finite depth of reasoning, as well as all types with an infinite depth of reasoning - in particular those types for whom finite-depth types are conceivable, or think that infnite-depth types are conceivable in the mind of other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010567938

Beauty Contests and "Irrational Exuberance": A Neoclassical Approach

Angeletos, George-Marios; Lorenzoni, Guido; Pavan, … - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2010

The arrival of new, unfamiliar, investment opportunities is often associated with "exuberant" movements in asset prices and real economic activity. During these episodes of high uncertainty, financial markets look at the real sector for signals about the profitability of the new investment...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008597110

The Missing Equilibria in Hotelling's Location Game

Bester, Helmut - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 1991

generates a coordination problem which the literature typically ignores by restricting firm 1 to locate in the first half and … firm 2 in the second half of market. We study the non-cooperative outcome in the absence of such a coordination device and … find that the location game possesses an infinity of mixed strategy Nash equilibria. in these equilibria coordination …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005252428

Contractual Federalism and Strategy-proof Coordination

Loeper, Antoine - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2008

This paper takes a mechanism design approach to federalism and assumes that local preferences are the private information of local jurisdictions. Contractual federalism is defined as a strategy-proof contract among the members of the federation supervised by a benevolent but not omniscient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008866081

Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity and Timing of Attacks

Angeletos, George-Marios; Pavan, Alessandro - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2007

Global games of regime change–coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008597104

Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications

Angeletos, George-Marios; Pavan, Alessandro - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2006

relation between the equilibrium and the socially optimal degrees of coordination. The former summarizes the private value from …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008597115

Some Personal Views of Game Theory

Kalai, Ehud - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 2006

This is a draft of a chapter for a book called "Game Theory, 5 Questions," to be published by Automatic Pressed/VIP.Below are five questions and my answers. Any feedback is appreciated.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005588600

Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games

Swinkels, Jeroen M. - Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and … - 1991

When a strategic situation arises repeatedly, the possibility arises that equilibrium predictions can be justified by a dynamic adjustment process. We examine myopic adjustment dynamics, a class that includes replicator dynamics from evolutionary game theory, simple models of imitation, models...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766802