Showing 1 - 10 of 22
Cr¨¦mer and McLean [1] and McAfee and Reny [3] showed that, in "nearly all auctions", the seller can offer a mechanism that obtains full rent extraction. The mechanism designed by Cr¨¦mer and McLean differs from standard procedures in several respects. Notably, (a) bidders are required to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005687412
Crer and McLean [2] and McAfee and Reny [4] showed that, in "nearly all auctions", the seller can offer a mechanism that obtains full rent extraction. Later, Robert [8] showed that the result fails in the presence of either limited liability or risk aversion. This paper provides yet another...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005687444
We give a definition of reasoning by analogy, which is tailored to a setting of decision making under uncertainty. We present a model of decision making which is based on such a definition, and show that it is compatible with a large class of preferences
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005687463
We provide an alternative proof of a theorem of Marinacci [2] regarding the equality of two convex-ranged measures. Specifically, we show that, if P and Q are two nonatomic, countably additive probabilities on a measurable space (S, S), the condition [A* S with 0 < P(A*) < 1 such that P(A*) = P(B)=> Q(A*) = Q(B) whenever B?S] is...</p(a*)>
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005687502
For (S, S) a measurable space, let C1 and C2 and be convex, weak* closed sets of probability measures on S. We show that if C1 C2 satisfies the Lyapunov property, then there exists a set A S such that min C1 (A) max C2 (A). We give applications to Maxmin Expected Utility and to the core of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005687521
In repeated games with public monitoring, the consideration of behavior strategies makes relevant the distinction between public and private strategies. Recently, Kandori and Obara [6] and Mailath, Matthews and Sekiguchi [8] have provided examples of games with equilibrium payoffs in private...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005811925
The paper provides a notion of measurability which is suited for a class of Multiple Prior Models. Those characterized by nonatomic countably additive priors. Preferences generating such representations have been recently axiomatized in [12]. A notable feature of our definition of measurability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005811930
We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility cooperative games introduced by Aumann and Shapley [2], and, more in general, of those games that admit a na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, studied by Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005549066
We show that a general process of decision making involves uncertainty about two different sets: the domain of the acts and another set, which we call the set of models for the decision maker. We study the effect of different information structures on the set of models, and prove the existence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005549079
We study the properties associated to various definitions of ambiguity ([8], [9], [18] and [23]) in the context of Maximin Expected Utility (MEU). We show that each definition of unambiguous events produces certain restrictions on the set of priors, and completely characterize each definition in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005549153