Showing 1 - 10 of 23
The increased availability of process measures implies that quality of care is in some areas de facto verifiable. Optimal price-setting for verifiable quality is well-described in the incentive-design literature. We seek to narrow the large gap between actual price-setting behaviour in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011133560
In 2008 the income of female GPs was 70%, and their wages (income per hour) were 89%, of those of male GPs. We estimate Oaxaca decompositions using OLS models of wages (income/hours) and 2SLS models of income. The elasticity of income with respect to hours is 0.91 for female GPs and 0.29 for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008836167
We model and compare the bargaining process between a purchaser of health services, such as a health authority, and a provider (the hospital) in three plausible scenarios: a) the purchaser sets the price, and activity is bargained between the purchaser and the provider: activity bargaining; b)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005523965
In many public health care systems treatment is rationed by waiting time. We examine the optimal allocation of a .xed supply of a treatment between di¤erent groups of patients. Even in the absence of any distributional aims welfare is increased by third degree waiting time discrimination....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005523988
The optimal allocation of a public health care budget across treatments must take account of the way in which care is rationed within treatments since this will affect their marginal value. We investigate the optimal allocation rules for health care systems where user charges are fixed and care...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005524021
We examine the implications of policies to improve information about the qualities of profit seeking duopoly hospitals which face the same regulated price and compete on quality. We show that if the hospital costs of quality are similar then better information increases the quality of both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012249
We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser (a principal) and a provider (an agent). We assume that: a) providers differ in efficiency and there are two types of provider; b) efficiency is private information (adverse selection); c) providers are partially altruistic or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005129612
In 2004 the income of female GPs was 70%, and their wages (income per hour) were 91%, of those of male GPs. We compare estimates of gender discrimination from Oaxaca decompositions using models of wages (income/hours), OLS and 2SLS models of income, and propensity score matching. We propose a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328427
We analyse the demand for and the supply of night visits in primary care. A model of demand management by general practitioners and of their choice between meeting demand by making visits themselves or passing them to commercial deputising services is presented. Demand and supply equations are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328456
We present a model of optimal contracting between a purchaser and a provider of health services when quality has two dimensions. We assume that one dimension of quality is contractible (dimension 1) and one dimension is not contractible (dimension 2). We show that the optimal incentive scheme...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005328472