The paper provides a baseline model for regulatory analysis of systemic liquidity shocks. We show that banks may have an incentive to invest excessively in illiquid long term projects. In the prevailing mixed strategy equilibrium the allocation is inferior from the investor’s point of view...

Nach dem aus historischer Perspektive außergewöhnlich starken Rückgang des weltweiten Bruttoinlandsprodukts im Jahr 2009 ist eine Diskussion darüber entbrannt, inwieweit die derzeitige Finanzkrise Einfluss auf die mittelfristigen Wachstumsperspektiven einer Volkswirtschaft hat. So war der...

In this paper we assess the information content of seven widely cited early indicators for the euro area with respect to forecasting area-wide industrial production. To this end, we use various tests that are designed to compare competing forecast models. In addition to the standard...

This paper provides a compact framework for banking regulation analysis in the presence of uncertainty between systemic liquidity and solvency shocks. Extending the work by Cao & Illing (2009a, b), it is shown that systemic liquidity shortage arises endogenously as part of the inferior mixed...

The paper models the interaction between risk taking in the financial sector and central bank policy. It shows that in the absence of central bank intervention, the incentive of financial intermediaries to free ride on liquidity in good states may result in excessively low liquidity in bad...

Traditionally, aggregate liquidity shocks are modelled as exogenous events. Extending our previous work (Cao & Illing, 2007), this paper analyses the adequate policy response to endogenous systemic liquidity risk. We analyse the feedback between lender of last resort policy and incentives of...

This paper evaluates the predictions of different price setting theories using a new dataset constructed from a large panel of business surveys of German retail firms over the period 1970-2010. The dataset contains firm-specific information on both price realizations and expectations....