Showing 1 - 10 of 14
In 1985 Aumann axiomatized the Shapley NTU value by non-emptiness, efficiency, unanimity, scale covariance, conditional additivity, and independence of irrelevant alternatives. We show that, when replacing unanimity by "unanimity for the grand coalition" and translation covariance, these axioms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010562394
We consider several related set extensions of the core and the anticore of games with transferable utility. An … polytopes with a core-like structure. One of these polytopes is the L1-center, consisting of all efficient allocations that … contained in the undominated set. For three-person games all these sets coincide. These three sets also coincide with the core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421707
An element of the possibly unbounded core of a cooperative game with precedence constraints belongs to its bounded core … if any transfer to a player from any of her subordinates results in payoffs outside the core. The bounded core is the … union of all bounded faces of the core, it is nonempty if the core is nonempty, and it is a continuous correspondence on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010611661
The core cover of a TU-game is a superset of the core and equals the convex hull of its larginal vectors. A larginal … game is called compromise stable if the core is equal to the core cover, i.e. the core is the convex hull of the larginal … vectors. This paper analyzes the structure of orderings corresponding to larginal vectors of the core cover and conditions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010593461
generated by a partial order on the set of players. In such a situation, the core may be unbounded, and one has to select a … bounded part of the core as a solution concept. The restricted core is obtained by imposing equality constraints in the core … for sets belonging to so-called normal collections, resulting (if nonempty) in the selection of a bounded face of the core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010585720
It is well-known that the core on several domains of cooperative transferable utility (TU) and nontransferable utility … is shown that, if communication structures are present, the core may still be characterized on balanced TU games, on … totally balanced TU games, on NTU games with a nonempty core, on the domains of all TU or NTU games, and on several other …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818958
investigate the NSPKs and NSPNs and their relations to the positive prekernel and to the positive core. It turns out that any NSPK …. Several classes of NSPNs are presented, all of them are subsolutions of the positive core. It is shown that any NSPN is a … subsolution of the positive core provided that it satisfies the equal treatment property on an infinite universe of potential …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009149973
In this paper, we analyze the equilibrium of a sequential game-theoretical model of lobbying, due to Groseclose and Snyder (1996), describing a legislature that vote over two alternatives, where two opposing lobbies, Lobby 0 and Lobby 1, compete by bidding for legislators’ votes. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009225867
t is well-known that the prenucleolus on the class of TU games is characterized by singlevaluedness, covariance under strategic equivalence, anonymity, and the reduced game property. We show that the prenucleolus on the class of TU games restricted to the connected coalitions with respect to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421711
We generalize the characterizations of the positive core and the positive prekernel to TU games with precedence … constraints and show that the positive core is characterized by non-emptiness (NE), boundedness (BOUND), covariance under … generalized Davis-Maschler reduced games, and the possibility of nondiscrimination. The bounded positive core, i.e., the union of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010818963