Showing 1 - 10 of 157
in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010646
-proof mechanism if some agents are sincere. We use lab experiments to study the preferences of subjects for the Boston mechanism or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012139539
for SD, but mainly when priorities are merit-based. Stated voting motives indicate that choosing SD is driven by concerns …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014495059
Promise competition is prevalent in many economic environments, but promise keeping is often difficult to observe. We study the value of transparency for promise competition and ask whether promises still offer an opportunity to honor future obligations when outcomes do not allow for observing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014481101
Under simple majority voting an absolute majority of voters may choose policies that are harmful to minorities. It is … the purpose of sub- and super-majority rules to protect legitimate minority interests. We study how voting rules are … choose voting rules for given distributions of gains and losses that can arise from a policy, but before learning their own …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014476824
Following the notion that organizations often face public good dilemmas when collective action is needed, we use a real-time provision-point mechanism to experimentally explore the process of achieving cooperative equilibria. Specifically, besides exploring group outcomes, we identify individual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011900072
threshold public good games to our reward-based setting. Secondly, we develop the novel bid-cap rule. Here, pledges must only be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014479171
In this paper, we investigate whether dynamic incentive schemes lead to a ratchet effect in a social dilemma. We test whether subjects strategically restrict their contribution levels at the beginning of a cumulative public goods game in order to avoid high obligations in the future and how this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012196294
We experimentally test a theoretically promising amendment to the ratchet-up mechanism of the Paris Agreement. The ratchet-up mechanism prescribes that parties’ commitments to the global response to climate change cannot decrease over time and our results confirm that its effect is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013460308
The paper surveys the experimental literature on matching markets. It covers house allocation, school choice, and two-sided matching markets such as college admissions. The main focus of the survey is on truth-telling and strategic manipulations by the agents, on the stability and efficiency of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012033568