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The political economy of negotiating international carbon markets

Arvaniti, Maria; Habla, Wolfgang - 2020 - This version: April 2020

International carbon markets are frequently propagated as an efficient instrument for reducing CO2 emissions. We argue that such markets, despite their desirable efficiency properties, might not be in the best interest of governments who are guided by strategic considerations in negotiations. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012215277

Effects of the CDM on Poverty Eradication and Global Climate Protection

Rübbelke, Dirk T. G. - 2014

In an impure public good model we analyze the effects of CDM transfers on poverty as well as on the global climate protection level. We construct an analytical model of a developing and an industrialized region, both of which independently seek to maximize their utility - a function of private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012708599

Leadership and International Climate Cooperation

Schwerhoff, Gregor - 2014

Which kind of reaction can a nation or group of nations expect when leading by example in climate policy? This literature survey describes possible positive reaction mechanisms from different fields of economics, some of which have scarcely been linked to climate economics previously. One effect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060204

Contributing or Free-Riding? A Theory of Endogenous Lobby Formation

Konishi, Hideo; Furusawa, Taiji - 2008

We consider a two-stage public goods provision game: In the first stage, players simultaneously decide if they will join a contribution group or not. In the second stage, players in the contribution group simultaneously offer contribution schemes in order to influence the government's choice on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014219141

Sharing R&D Investments in Breakthrough Technologies to Control Climate Change

Rubio, Santiago J. - 2016

This paper examines international cooperation on technological development as an alternative to international cooperation on GHG emission reductions. In order to analyze the scope of cooperation, a three-stage technology agreement formation game is solved. First, countries decide whether or not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014128970

Mixed motives : an empirical analysis of ILO roll-call votes

Boockmann, Bernhard - 2002

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013428483

A Tragic Solution to the Collective Action Problem : Implications for Corruption, Conflict and Inequality

Nieva, Ricardo - 2020

We study the role of an enforcer in the effectiveness of selective incentives in solving the collective action problem when groups take part in a contest. Cost functions exhibit constant elasticity of marginal effort costs. If prize valuations are homogeneous, our source of heterogeneity induces...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012822548

Personality traits and cognitive ability in political selection

Jokela, Markus; Meriläinen, Jaakko; Tukiainen, Janne; … - 2023 - February 2023 (first version July 2022, second version August 2022)

We present the first comprehensive evidence on the role of cognitive ability and personality traits in the selection of electoral candidates and election of politicians. Using unique data that combine population registers and election statistics from local government elections in Finland with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013280142

Self-persuasion : evidence from field experiments at international debating competitions

Schwardmann, Peter; Tripodi, Egon; Weele, Joël J. van der - 2021

Laboratory evidence shows that when people have to argue for a given position, they persuade themselves about the position’s factual and moral superiority. Such self-persuasion limits the potential of communication to resolve conflict and reduce polarization. We test for this phenomenon in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013191465

United We Vote

Eguia, Jon X. - 2006

This paper studies the advantages that a coalition of agents obtains by forming a voting bloc to pool their votes and … the voting bloc, both if the agent is a member of the bloc and if the agent is not part of the bloc. We also determine … whether individual agents prefer to participate in or step out of the bloc, and we find the different optimal internal voting …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014059981