The game-theoretical analysis of this paper shows that stress tests that cover the entire banking sector (macro stress tests) can be performed by institutional supervisors to improve welfare. In a multi-receiver framework of Bayesian persuasion we show that a banking authority can create value...

The matching literature commonly rules out that market design itself shapes agent preferences. Underlying this premise is the assumption that agents know their own preferences at the outset and that preferences do not change throughout the matching process. Under this assumption, a centralized...

Many individuals have empathetic feelings towards animals but frequently consume meat. We investigate this "meat paradox" using insights from the literature on motivated reasoning in moral dilemmata. We develop a model where individuals form self-serving beliefs about the suffering of animals...

This paper develops a theory in which heterogeneity in political preferences produces a partisan disagreement about objective facts. A political decision involving both idiosyncratic preferences and scientific knowledge is considered. Voters form motivated beliefs in order to improve their...

This paper shows that, in the canonical dynamic rational expectations equilibrium model, public information about future noise trading is potentially detrimental to contemporaneous price efficiency. Our result supports concerns that social sentiment investing, sparked by growing availability of...

It is well known that information arrival has an impact on prices volatility, and trading volume in financial markets (see e.g., Goodhart and O'Hara 1997). Scheduled macroeconomic announcements, such as monthly employment figures, consumer prices, or building permits, stand out from the steady...

This paper analyzes how newly introduced transparency requirements for short positions affect investors' behavior and security prices. Employing a unique data set, which contains both public positions above and confidential positions below the regulatory disclosure threshold, we offer several...

This paper presents an experiment on a coordination game with extrinsic random signals, in which we systematically vary the stochastic process generating these signals and measure how signals affect behavior. We find that sunspot equilibria emerge naturally if there are salient public signals....