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Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697162
reciprocity and inequality aversion reduce the attraction of performance related pay. Other-regarding preferences influence both …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261940
We conduct a field experiment where we vary both the presence of a gift-exchange wage and the effect of the worker's effort on the manager's payoff. Results indicate a strong complementarity between the initial wage-gift and the agent's ability to "repay the gift". We control for differences in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012064798
mechanism's robustness is explored in further experiments. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010319469
mechanism's robustness is explored in further experiments. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884174
In markets with quality unobservable to buyers, third-party certification is often the only instrument to increase transparency. While both sellers and buyers have a demand for certification, its role differs fundamentally: sellers use it for signaling, buyers use it for inspection. Seller...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590937
I study a cheap talk model between a buyer and a seller with two goods for sale. There is two-sided (independent) private information with sequential, two-way communication. In the first stage, the buyer communicates her private preferences to the seller. In the second stage, the seller...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014479178
In Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature almost exclusively looks at buyers in such combined mechanisms, the current paper summarizes results from the sellers' point of view. Buy-It-Now auctions are complex mechanisms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014477420
This paper studies the implications of agents signaling their moral type in a lying game. In the theoretical analysis, a signaling motive emerges where agents dislike being suspected of lying and where some types of liars are more stigmatized than others. The equilibrium prediction of the model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012500269
We investigate experimentally whether individuals or groups are more lied to, and how lying depends on the group size and the monetary loss inflicted by the lie. We employ an observed cheating game, where an individual's misreport of a privately observed number can monetarily benefit her while...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014476599