We investigate the welfare effect of increasing competition in an anonymous two-sided matching market, where matched pairs play an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Higher matching efficiency is usually considered detrimental as it creates stronger incentives for defection. We point out,...

We investigate the welfare effect of increasing competition in an anonymous two-sided matching market, where matched pairs play an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Higher matching efficiency is usually considered detrimental as it creates stronger incentives for defection. We point out,...

The extent of pharmaceutical advertising and promotion can be characterized by a balancing act between profitable demand expansions and potentially unfavorable subsequent regulatory actions. However, this balance also depends on the nature of competition (e.g. monopoly versus oligopoly). In this...

This paper analyzes determinants of ex-manufacturer prices for originator and generic drugs across a large sample of countries. We focus on drugs to treat HIV/AIDS, TB and malaria in middle and low income countries (MLICs), with robustness checks to other therapeutic categories and other...

Economic literature has extensively studied how prices for incumbent pharmaceutical drugs respond to generic competition after entry. However, less attention has been paid to pricing behavior in anticipation of brand-to-brand competition. We contribute to this gap in the literature by both...

Drug pricing in the U.S. is a persistently vexing policy problem. While there is agreement among many policy analysts that supra competitive prices are necessary to promote innovation; significant disagreements arise over how much pricing discretion prescription drug manufacturers should be...

We establish four facts concerning competition among U.S. generic drug suppliers, using IQVIA's National Sales PerspectiveTM 2004Q4 – 2016Q3 data. We define a unique product market (“molform”), consisting of the combination of a molecule active ingredient and a route of administration...