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, potentially complementary, input fixed. We introduce a class of such reallocations -- correlated matching rules -- that includes … the status quo allocation, a random allocation, and both the perfect positive and negative assortative matching …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463788
In this paper we nonparametrically analyze the effects of reallocating individuals across social groups in the presence of social spillovers. Individuals are either 'high' or 'low' types. Own outcomes may vary with the fraction of high types in one's social group. We characterize the average...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462158
Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this paper we study how a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462472
, matching can occur (inefficiently) early only when there is comparable demand and supply: a surplus of applicants, but a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463643
We study a simple model of a decentralized market game in which firms make directed offers to workers. We focus on markets in which agents have aligned preferences. When agents have complete information or when there are no frictions in the economy, there exists an equilibrium that yields the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463807
From 1986 through 1997 the entry-level market for American gastroenterologists was organized by a centralized clearinghouse. Before, and since, it has been conducted via a decentralized market in which appointment dates have unraveled to well over a year before the start of employment. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470100
. Consider the following matching mechanism: take a random draw from the `W=w_j` subgroup of the first population and match her … function (AMF), denote the expected output associated with this match. We show that (i) the AMF is identified when matching is … conditionally exogenous, (ii) conditionally exogenous matching is compatible with a pairwise stable aggregate matching equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456576
Criteria for evaluating school choice mechanisms are first, whether truth-telling is sometimes punished and second, how efficient the match is. With common knowledge preferences, Deferred Acceptance (DA) dominates the Boston mechanism by the first criterion and is ambiguously ranked by the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464029