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This paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that a single and multiple lottery mechanism are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462516
doctors and psychologists, because couples view pairs of jobs as complements. A stable matching may not exist when couples are … present. We find conditions under which a stable matching exists with high probability in large markets. We present a … mechanism that finds a stable matching with high probability, and which makes truth-telling by all participants an approximate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462624
The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences--ties--in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463784
Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC's school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457621
Conventional value-added models (VAMs) compare average test scores across schools after regression-adjusting for students' demographic characteristics and previous scores. This paper tests for VAM bias using a procedure that asks whether VAM estimates accurately predict the achievement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012456922