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Individual Rationality and Participation in Large Scale, Multi-Hospital Kidney Exchange

Ashlagi, Itai - 2011

As multi-hospital kidney exchange clearinghouses have grown, the set of players has grown from patients and surgeons to include hospitals. Hospitals have the option of enrolling only their hard-to-match patient-donor pairs, while conducting easily arranged exchanges internally. This behavior has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012461937

Matching with Couples : Stability and Incentives in Large Markets

Kojima, Fuhito - 2010

doctors and psychologists, because couples view pairs of jobs as complements. A stable matching may not exist when couples are … present. We find conditions under which a stable matching exists with high probability in large markets. We present a … mechanism that finds a stable matching with high probability, and which makes truth-telling by all participants an approximate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462624

Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply : An Experimental Investigation

Niederle, Muriel - 2009

, matching can occur (inefficiently) early only when there is comparable demand and supply: a surplus of applicants, but a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463643

Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences : Redesigning the New York City High School Match

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila - 2009

The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences--ties--in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463784

Kidney Exchange

Roth, Alvin E. - 2003

Most transplanted kidneys are from cadavers, but there are also substantial numbers of transplants from live donors. Recently, there have started to be kidney exchanges involving two donor-patient pairs such that each donor cannot give a kidney to the intended recipient because of immunological...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468710

Unraveling Reduces the Scope of an Entry Level Labor Market : Gastroenterology With and Without a Centralized Match

Niederle, Muriel - 2001

From 1986 through 1997 the entry-level market for American gastroenterologists was organized by a centralized clearinghouse. Before, and since, it has been conducted via a decentralized market in which appointment dates have unraveled to well over a year before the start of employment. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470100