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Report-dependent utility and strategy-proofness

Meisner, Vincent - 2021

Despite the truthful dominant strategy, participants in strategy-proof me- chanisms submit manipulated preferences. In our model, participants dislike rejections and enjoy the confirmation from getting what they declared most desirable. Formally, the payoff from a match decreases in its position...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648382

Improving transparency and verifiability in school admissions : theory and experiment

Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Raghavan, Madhav - 2023

Students participating in centralized admissions procedures do not typically have access to the information used to determine their matched school, such as other students' preferences or school priorities. This can lead to doubts about whether their matched schools were computed correctly (the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014477372

Mutually Best Matches

Salonen, Hannu; Salonen, Mikko A.A. - 2016

individually rational matching, the matching has many good properties like Pareto optimality and stability. If preferences satisfy … matching. These properties guarantee also that the student proposing Deferred Acceptance algorithm (DA) and the Top Trading … Cycles algorithm (TTC) produce the same matching as IMB. We compare these results with some well-known results about when DA …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503062

Smart Matching Platforms and Heterogeneous Beliefs in Centralized School Choice

Arteaga, Felipe; Kapor, Adam J.; Neilson, Christopher A.; … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021

search for schools, and that "smart matching platforms" that provide live feedback on admissions chances help applicants …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012585430

School Choice

Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila; Andersson, Tommy - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022

, this market for school seats is cleared via market design solutions grounded in recent advances in matching and mechanism …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013172122

Inattention and Inequity in School Matching

Bucher, Stefan F.; Caplin, Andrew - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021

field studies of school matching show that information is imperfect, particularly for disadvantaged students. We model …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012794614

Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching

Rees-Jones, Alex - 2020

. We study the relevance of this mistake in students' interactions with school-choice matching mechanisms. In a lab … implications that arise for the design and deployment of student-to-school matching mechanisms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479258

Lotteries in Student Assignment : An Equivalence Result

Pathak, Parag A. - 2010

This paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that a single and multiple lottery mechanism are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462516

Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences : Redesigning the New York City High School Match

Abdulkadiroglu, Atila - 2009

The design of the New York City (NYC) High School match involved tradeoffs among efficiency, stability and strategy-proofness that raise new theoretical questions. We analyze a model with indifferences--ties--in school preferences. Simulations with field data and the theory favor breaking...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463784

What happens when separate and unequal school districts merge?

Aue, Robert; Klein, Thilo; Ortega, Josue - 2020

students' welfare, even if the student-optimal stable matching is consistently chosen. However, on average all students …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012241889