Similar Search Results

Improving transparency and verifiability in school admissions : theory and experiment

Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Raghavan, Madhav - 2023

Students participating in centralized admissions procedures do not typically have access to the information used to determine their matched school, such as other students' preferences or school priorities. This can lead to doubts about whether their matched schools were computed correctly (the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014477372

Report-dependent utility and strategy-proofness

Meisner, Vincent - 2021

Despite the truthful dominant strategy, participants in strategy-proof me- chanisms submit manipulated preferences. In our model, participants dislike rejections and enjoy the confirmation from getting what they declared most desirable. Formally, the payoff from a match decreases in its position...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648382

School choice and loss aversion

Meisner, Vincent; Wangenheim, Jonas von - 2019

Extensive evidence suggests that participants in the direct student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism (DSPDA) play dominated strategies. In particular, students with low priority tend to misrepresent their preferences for popular schools. To explain the observed data, we introduce...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138798

Fair procedures with naive agents : who wants the Boston mechanism?

König, Tobias; Kübler, Dorothea; Mechtenberg, Lydia; … - 2019

the assortative matching. We compare the preferences of stakeholders who know their own role with agents behind the veil … vote for the assortative matching otherwise. This is in line with the model of Pathak and Sönmez (2008). Subjects behind … the mechanism are split in their vote for the Boston mechanism and the assortative matching. According to the spectators …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012139539

Decentralizing centralized matching markets : implications from early offers in university admissions

Grenet, Julien; He, Yinghua; Kübler, Dorothea - 2019

The matching literature commonly rules out that market design itself shapes agent preferences. Underlying this premise … matching process. Under this assumption, a centralized matching market can often outperform a decentralized one. Using a quasi …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012033869

What happens when separate and unequal school districts merge?

Aue, Robert; Klein, Thilo; Ortega, Josue - 2020

students' welfare, even if the student-optimal stable matching is consistently chosen. However, on average all students …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012241889

Fairness in matching markets : experimental evidence

König, Tobias; Kübler, Dorothea; Mechtenberg, Lydia; … - 2023

We investigate fairness preferences in matching mechanisms using a spectator design. Participants choose between the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014495059

Correlation Neglect in Student-to-School Matching

Rees-Jones, Alex - 2020

. We study the relevance of this mistake in students' interactions with school-choice matching mechanisms. In a lab … implications that arise for the design and deployment of student-to-school matching mechanisms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479258

Inattention and Inequity in School Matching

Bucher, Stefan F.; Caplin, Andrew - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021

field studies of school matching show that information is imperfect, particularly for disadvantaged students. We model …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012794614

Lotteries in Student Assignment : An Equivalence Result

Pathak, Parag A. - 2010

This paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that a single and multiple lottery mechanism are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462516