Monetary policy leaves a fiscal footprint. In some circumstances, relieving the fiscal burden becomes the main goal of policy, and inflation control is subordinate. This article notes that the same is true of macroprudential policy, and it characterizes the size and sign of its fiscal footprint,...

When is it optimal for a government to default on its legal repayment obligations? We answer this question for a small open economy with domestic production risk in which contracting frictions make it optimal for the government to finance itself by issuing non-contingent debt. We show that...

How high can public debt rise without compromising fiscal solvency? We answer this question using a stochastic ability-to-pay model of sovereign default in which risk-neutral investors lend to a government that displays "fiscal fatigue," because its ability to increase primary balances cannot...

Recurrent concerns over debt sustainability in emerging and developed nations have prompted renewed debate on the role of fiscal rules. Their optimality, however, remains unclear. We provide a quantitative analysis of fiscal rules in a standard model of sovereign debt accumulation and default...

What determines the sustainability of sovereign debt? We develop a model where myopic governments seek popularity but can nevertheless commit credibly to service external debt. They do not default when debt is low because they would lose access to debt markets and be forced to reduce spending;...

Budget-neutral tax wedge reductions rank high in the policy agenda of several EMU member states. Using a New Keynesian DSGE model of a monetary union with a complex labour market structure and a comprehensive public sector, we evaluate the macroeconomic and welfare effects of reducing the firms'...

We introduce a solution technique for the study of discrete time stochastic models populated by long-lived agents. We introduce aggregate uncertainty and complete markets into a 'perpetual-youth' model of a kind first studied by Olivier Blanchard and we show that the pure-trade version of the...

This paper studies the bank-sovereign link in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium set-up with strategic default on public debt. Heterogeneous banks give rise to an interbank market where government bonds are used as collateral. A default penalty arises from a breakdown of interbank...

Using data from 56 nations over 45 years, we find that nations that are more likely to elect left wing governments face higher (and more volatile) sovereign spreads. To explain these facts, we build a sovereign default model in which two policymakers (left and right) alternate in power. The...

In the data sovereign default is always partial and varies in its duration. Debt levels during default episodes initially increase and do not experience reductions upon resolution. This paper presents a theory of sovereign default that replicates these properties, which are absent in standard...