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by curbing risk-taking incentives, the higher the leverage the bank is permitted to take on. Consequently, the risk …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011539591
This paper proposes a new regulatory approach that implements capital requirements contingent on managerial compensation. We argue that excessive risk taking in the financial sector originates from the shareholder moral hazard created by government guarantees rather than from corporate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010226049
This paper deals with both system-wide and banks' internal stress tests. For system-wide stress tests it describes the evolution over time, compares the stress test design in major jurisdictions, and discusses academic research. System-wide stress tests have gained in importance and nowadays...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012534563
. Crises and recessions often occur independently of domestic leverage, making the credit-to-GDP gap a deficient early …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431742
according to the hierarchical status of the respective market participant, and can therefore endanger sovereign debt …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526423
unweighted leverage requirements, their differential impact on bank lending, and equity buffer accumulation in excess of …. Tighter leverage requirements, on the other hand, increase lending, preserve bank charter value and incentives to accumulate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011955629
the risk of default outweighs the cost advantages of debt financing. In this setting, banks with lower monitoring costs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014476708
We empirically examine the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) used by the US government to bail out distressed banks with equity infusions during the Great Recession. We find strong evidence that a feature of the CPP - the government's ability to appoint independent directors on the board of an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012643917
We empirically examine the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) used by the US gov- ernment to bail out distressed banks with equity infusions during the Great Recession. We find strong evidence that a feature of the CPP – the government’s ability to ap- point independent directors on the board of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584933
risk on a larger scale, inducing risk-taking. This effect is more pronounced when bank leverage constraints are looser, or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020122