Start-up subsidies play an important role in supporting start-up innovation and performance. However, what characteristics help and hinder start-ups to seek start-up subsidies remains unclear. We study whether and how founder personality, as captured by the big five personality traits and...

Research suggests that public subsidies for newly founded firms have a positive effect on follow-on financing, in particular, Venture Capital (VC). This study differentiates between Government VC, Independent VC, Corporate VC, and Business Angels and shows that public subsidies are not relevant...

Anti-tax loss trafficking rules disallow the use of loss carryforwards after a change in ownership or activity (such as significant changes in turnover, employment, or the product portfolio). This restriction could threaten accumulated loss carryforwards of start-ups. Accounting for the...

In recent years governments around the world have introduced policies to stimulate investments in early stage entrepreneurial companies, in particular investments by Angel investors. In this paper we study whether introducing subsidies to Angel investors has effects on startups’ access to...

Venture capital markets are characterized by multiple incentive problems and asymmetric information in an uncertain environment. All kinds of agency problems are present: moral hazard, adverse selection, hold-up problems, window dressing, etc. Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists enter into...

In markets with quality unobservable to buyers, third-party certification is often the only instrument to increase transparency. While both sellers and buyers have a demand for certification, its role differs fundamentally: sellers use it for signaling, buyers use it for inspection. Seller...

This paper tests for the sensitivity of R&D to financing constraints conditional on restrictions in external financing. Financing constraints of firms are identified by an exogenously calculated rating index. Restrictions in external financing are determined by (i) the specific time period...

We demonstrate how the incentives of firms that partially own their suppliers or customers to foreclose rivals depend on how the partial owner can extract profits from the target. Compared to a fully vertically integrated firm, a partial owner may obtain only a share of the target's profit but...