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If agents are exposed to continual competitive pressure, how does a short-term variation of the severity of the competition affect agents' performance? In a real-effort laboratory experiment, we study a one-time increase in incentives in a sequence of equally incentivized contests. Our results...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011895040
work periods as tournaments that are linked through fatigue spillovers, inducing a non-time-separable decision problem. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011976073
literature on tournaments within firms, which shows that competitive compensation schemes reduce cooperation in the short-run, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014493908
: employees that create lower expected profits as managers have yet better promotion prospects. That finding still holds when the … firm owner optimally chooses the promotion rule, the degree of delegation, and wage payments to both employees and managers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138859
Individual labour productivities are often unobservable for firms when hiring new workers. Job protection may prevent firms ex post from using information about labour productivities. We show that a binding minimum wage introduced in the presence of job protection will lead to lower unemployment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009302708
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We examine the relation between consumer search and equilibrium prices when collusion is endogenously determined. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012007152
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012172857
Volunteering is a widespread allocation mechanism in the workplace. It emerges naturally in software development or the generation of online knowledge platforms. Using a field experiment with more than 2000 workers, we study the effect of team size on volunteering in an online labor market. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013411312
This paper shows that the possibility of collusion between an agent and a supervisor imposes no restrictions on the set … implementable if the supervisor's information was public is also implementable when this information is private and collusion is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011902729