Showing 1 - 10 of 21
We investigate the welfare effect of increasing competition in an anonymous two-sided matching market, where matched … welfare because more agents find themselves in a cooperative relationship. We characterize the conditions for which increasing … competition increases overall welfare. In particular, this is always the case when the incentives for defection are high. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013331070
We investigate the welfare effect of increasing competition in an anonymous two-sided matching market, where matched … welfare because more agents find themselves in a cooperative relationship. We characterize the conditions for which increasing … competition increases overall welfare. In particular, this is always the case when the incentives for defection are high. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014458804
This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the … market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes …. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market frictions. But, when these frictions become negligible, the equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587476
This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the … market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes …. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market frictions. But, when these frictions become negligible, the equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648091
inequality and raises unemployment, but expected welfare gains are ensured if workers are risk neutral. And while wage inequality …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003868538
This paper specifies a new convenient algorithm to construct policy projections conditional on alternative anticipated policy-rate paths in linearized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, such as Ramses, the Riksbank's main DSGE model. Such projections with anticipated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008696833
This paper studies investment incentives in the steady state of a dynamic bilateral matching market. Because of search frictions, both parties in a match are partially locked-in when they bargain over the joint surplus from their sunk investments. The associated holdup problem depends on market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003875985
This paper studies the innovation dynamics of an oligopolistic industry. The firms compete not only in the output market but also by engaging in productivity enhancing innovations to reduce labor costs. Rent sharing may generate productivity dependent wage differentials. Productivity growth...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003942451
This paper studies a principal-agent relation in which the principal's private information about the agent's effort choice is more accurate than a noisy public performance measure. For some contingencies the optimal contract has to specify ex post inefficiencies in the form of inefficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752336
We analyze the optimal allocation of authority in an organization whose members have conflicting preferences. One party has decision-relevant private information, and the party who obtains authority decides in a self-interested way. As a novel element in the literature on decision rights, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752337