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We study how institutional design influences moral transgression. People are heterogeneous in their feelings of guilt and can share guilt with others. Institutions determine the number of supporters necessary for immoral outcomes to occur. With more supporters required, every supporter can share...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009763121
This paper studies how organizational design affects moral outcomes. Subjects face the decision to either kill mice for money or to save mice. We compare a Baseline treatment where subjects are fully pivotal to a Diffused-Pivotality treatment where subjects simultaneously choose in groups of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009763127
We elicit concern for animal welfare in an incentivized, direct and real setup that allows us to separate genuine … interest in animal welfare from confounding factors like advertisement, replacement arguments or image concerns. Subjects … (money) against the welfare of a hen. Our data shed light on a long-standing philosophical debate about the relationship …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011668500
We study the optimal design of information nudges for present-biased consumers who have to make sequential consumption decisions without exact prior knowledge of their long-term consequences. For arbitrary distributions of risk, there exists a consumer-optimal information nudge that is of cutoff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011931537
inequality and raises unemployment, but expected welfare gains are ensured if workers are risk neutral. And while wage inequality …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003868538
This paper specifies a new convenient algorithm to construct policy projections conditional on alternative anticipated policy-rate paths in linearized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, such as Ramses, the Riksbank's main DSGE model. Such projections with anticipated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008696833
In a tedious real effort task, agents can choose to receive information about their piece rate that is either low or ten times higher. One third of subjects deliberately decide to forego this instrumental information, revealing a preference for information avoidance. Strikingly, agents who face...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011284957
In a tedious real effort task, subjects know that their piece rate is either low or ten times higher. When subjects are informed about their piece rate realization, they adapt their performance. One third of subjects nevertheless forego this instrumental information when given the choice - and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011340265
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008747128