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cities to conduct a field experiment with roughly 350 donation appeals. We induce spatial differentiation by varying the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012105442
Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent experimental evidence suggests that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism to maintain cooperation among humans. In this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325392
A growing experimental literature studies the endogenous choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems arising in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the opportunity to influence the rules of the game before they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010646
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In the framework of the Paris Agreement implementation, financial transfers remain a major point of negotiation for addressing equity concerns raised by the ambitious climate objectives. In complement to the theoretical, experimental and numerical studies that have examined the role of transfers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012431927
experiment shows there is a workable alternative todeception. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010324715
The effects of stake size on cooperation and punishment are investigated using a public goods experiment. We find that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325183
Why do people leave high-income countries with extensive welfare states? This article will examine what underlies the emigration intentions of native-born inhabitants of one industrialized country in particular: the Netherlands. To understand emigration from high-income countries we focus not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325160
We analyze communication about the social returns to investment in a public good. We model two agents who have private information about these returns as well as their own taste for cooperation, or social preferences. Before deciding to contribute or not, each agent submits an unverifiable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011819534