In this paper it is tested which of the various alternative approaches for constructing knowledge spillover pools suggested in existing literature measures the extent to which a firm can costlessly receive external knowlegde best. Since knowledge spillovers are unmeasurable, a 'goodness of fit'...

This paper derives a three stage Cournot duopoly game for research collaboration, research expenditures and product market competition. The amount of knowledge firms can absorb from other firms is made dependent on their own research efforts, e.g., firms' absorptive capacity is treated as an...

This paper develops a three stage oligopoly game for R&D cooperation, R&D expenditure and product market competition. In the first stage, firms decide whether or not to conduct R&D in cooperation with other firms. In the second stage the level of R&D investment is determined. Finally, firms...

This paper develops a three stage oligopoly game for R&D cooperation, R&D expenditure and product market competition. In the first stage, firms decide whether or not to conduct R&D in cooperation with other firms. In the second stage the level of R&D investment is determined. Finally, firms...

In this paper it is tested which of the various alternative approaches for constructing knowledge spillover pools suggested in existing literature measures the extent to which a firm can costlessly receive external knowlegde best. Since knowledge spillovers are unmeasurable, a 'goodness of fit'...

This paper derives a three stage Cournot duopoly game for research collaboration, research expenditures and product market competition. The amount of knowledge firms can absorb from other firms is made dependent on their own research efforts, e.g., firms' absorptive capacity is treated as an...