We exploit proprietary information on severed correspondent banking relationships (due to the stricter enforcement of financial crime regulation) to assess how payment disruptions impede cross-border trade. Using firm-level export data from emerging Europe, we show that when local respondent...

Banking across borders has risen substantially over the past two decades. Yet there is significant heterogeneity in the international and global activities of banks across countries. This paper develops and tests a theoretical model that explains this variation from an international trade theory...

The current global financial "non-system" is marked by instability. In the absence of global solutions, a series of regional arrangements of monetary cooperation have been emerging to cope with such instability. The paper focuses on regional payment systems as an initial step of regional...

We estimate a panel VAR model for the euro area to quantitatively assess how the uneven recourse of national banking systems in the euro area to the ECB's unconventional refinancing operations that led to the accumulation of large TARGET2 balances, has contributed to the propagation of different...

This short paper examines the effect of financial sanctions at the most disaggregated level possible, individual bank accounts. Using data from the Eurosystem's real-time gross settlement system TARGET2, we provide empirical evidence that sanctions imposed by the European Union on Russian banks...

This paper examines German and foreign bank factors that can explain cross-border central bank liquidity flows between Germany and the rest of the euro area. Using data from the German component of Eurosystem's real-time gross settlement system TARGET2 and BankFocus for the period between 2009...

We exploit proprietary information on severed correspondent banking relationships - due to the stricter enforcement of financial crime regulation - to assess how payment disruptions impede cross-border trade. Using firm-level export data from emerging Europe, we show that when local respondent...