The matching literature commonly rules out that market design itself shapes agent preferences. Underlying this premise … matching process. Under this assumption, a centralized matching market can often outperform a decentralized one. Using a quasi …

the assortative matching. We compare the preferences of stakeholders who know their own role with agents behind the veil … vote for the assortative matching otherwise. This is in line with the model of Pathak and Sönmez (2008). Subjects behind … the mechanism are split in their vote for the Boston mechanism and the assortative matching. According to the spectators …

We document experimentally how biased self-assessments affect the outcome of matching markets. In the experiments, we …, or to wait for the assortative matching based on their actual relative performance. Early offers are accepted more often …

The paper surveys the experimental literature on matching markets. It covers house allocation, school choice, and two …-sided matching markets such as college admissions. The main focus of the survey is on truth-telling and strategic manipulations by … the agents, on the stability and efficiency of the matching outcome, as well as on the distribution of utility. …

We investigate fairness preferences in matching mechanisms using a spectator design. Participants choose between the …