Showing 1 - 4 of 4
We analyze how agents' present bias affects optimal contracting in an infinite-horizon employment setting. The principal maximizes profits by offering a menu of contracts to naive agents: a virtual contract - which agents plan to choose in the future - and a real contract which they end up...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011591480
complexity and uncertainty. We exploit quasi-random assignment of employees to managers and study the role of frontline managers … administrative data and panel survey data from before and during the Covid-19 pandemic, we find that frontline managers who were …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014495739
also render teams' identity and image concerns salient. We study the effects of tournaments on team performance in a non … salience of team identity, social image concerns, and whether teams face monetary incentives. Increased salience of team … identity does not improve performance. Social image motivates the top performers. Additional monetary incentives improve all …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014495030
We conduct a field experiment where we vary both the presence of a gift-exchange wage and the effect of the worker's effort on the manager's payoff. Results indicate a strong complementarity between the initial wage-gift and the agent's ability to "repay the gift". We control for differences in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012064798