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This paper shows that the possibility of collusion between an agent and a supervisor imposes no restrictions on the set of implementable social choice functions (SCF) and associated payoff vectors. Any SCF and any payoff profile that are implementable if the supervisor's information was public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011902729
We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the … sufficiently strong, the expected revenue maximizing entry fee is the maximal fee that guarantees full participation. The larger is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013202847
We analyze a monopolist who offers different variants of a possibly dangerous product to heterogeneous customers. Product variants are distinguished by different safety attributes. Customers choose product usage which co- determines expected harm. We find that, even with customers being...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012319111
factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor competition and identifiability we add the possibility for clients to … (leading to several client-advisor interactions over the course of the game) or competition (allowing one advisor to have …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697162
We analyze the optimal allocation of authority in an organization whose members have conflicting preferences. One party has decision-relevant private information, and the party who obtains authority decides in a self-interested way. As a novel element in the literature on decision rights, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752337
In markets with quality unobservable to buyers, third-party certification is often the only instrument to increase transparency. While both sellers and buyers have a demand for certification, its role differs fundamentally: sellers use it for signaling, buyers use it for inspection. Seller...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011590937
We study contracting between a public good provider and users with private valuations of the good. We show that, once the provider extracts the users' private information, she benefits from manipulating the collective information received from all users when communicating with them. We derive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012255849
We show that every sequential screening model is equivalent to a standard text book static screening model. We use this result and apply well-established techniques from static screening to obtain solutions for classes of sequential screening models for which standard sequential screening...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011626592
In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers' productivities from their education choices. In reality, firms also use sophisticated pre-employment auditing to learn workers' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011878774
rationalizing quality-equivalent line extensions. Under competition, both average quality and market coverage are (weakly) higher … but monopoly can yield higher welfare than competition. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011899163