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We study markets for sensitive personal information. An agent wants to communicate with another party but any revealed information can be intercepted and sold to a third party whose reaction harms the agent. The market for information induces an adverse sorting effect, allocating the information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380192
We study markets for sensitive personal information. An agent wants to communicate with another party but any revealed information can be intercepted and sold to a third party whose reaction harms the agent. The market for information induces an adverse sorting effect, allocating the information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011433634
) private information with sequential, two-way communication. In the first stage, the buyer communicates her private preferences …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014479178
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003518841
We consider a monopolistic certifier selling certification services to a partially privately informed seller. The certifier can enable the seller to disclose her private information publicly, as well as gather additional market information about the good's quality publicly. We show that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015053483
We study the optimal design of information nudges for present-biased consumers who have to make sequential consumption decisions without exact prior knowledge of their long-term consequences. For arbitrary distributions of risk, there exists a consumer-optimal information nudge that is of cutoff...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011931537
In many trade environments - such as online markets - buyers fully learn their valuation for goods only after contracting. I characterize the buyer-optimal ex-ante information in such environments. Employing a classical sequential screening framework, I find that buyers prefer to remain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011762788
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In cases of conflict of interest, people can lie directly or evade the truth. We analyse this situation theoretically and test the key behavioural predictions in a novel sender-receiver game. We find senders prefer to deceive through evasion rather than direct lying, more so when evasion is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014495050
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000820336