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In a tedious real effort task, subjects know that their piece rate is either low or ten times higher. When subjects are informed about their piece rate realization, they adapt their performance. One third of subjects nevertheless forego this instrumental information when given the choice - and...
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Recent behavioral models argue in favor of avoidance of instrumental information. We explore the role of information avoidance in a real-effort setting. Our experiment offers three main results. First, we confirm that preferences for avoidance of instrumental information exist, studying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011751477
This paper emphasizes the two-way causality between the provision of unemployment insurance and the cultural … generate a lag between the introduction of unemployment insurance and a deterioration of the work ethic. Relying on a … calibration, I argue that it can account for a substantial fraction of the history of European unemployment since World War II. As …
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Tournaments are often used to improve performance in innovation contexts. Tournaments provide monetary incentives but also render teams' identity and image concerns salient. We study the effects of tournaments on team performance in a non-routine task and identify the importance of these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014495030
This paper studies a principal-agent relation in which the principal's private information about the agent's effort choice is more accurate than a noisy public performance measure. For some contingencies the optimal contract has to specify ex post inefficiencies in the form of inefficient...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752336
We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumerś problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...
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