We study the random assignment of indivisible objects among a set of agents with strict preferences. We show that there exists no mechanism which is unanimous, strategy-proof and envy-free. Weakening the first requirement to q-unanimity – i.e., when every agent ranks a different object at the...

Using a new experimental design, we compare how subjects form beliefs in an investor-client setup under varying degrees of liability. Our results reflect the importance of social preferences when making investment decisions for others. We show that when investors have no liability, those with...

Firms are usually reluctant to disclose information about the production costs of their goods and services; however, some firms have recently started to disclose cost information to consumers. This research examines the consequences of disclosing transaction-level wage information on consumer...

In Folge der starken Rezession kommt es durch diskretionäre Maßnahmen der Bundesregierung und die Auswirkung der automatischen Stabilisatoren zu einem erheblichen Anstieg des Staatsdefizits. Im Ergebnis wird das Niveau der öffentlichen Verschuldung bei Rückkehr zur wirtschaftlichen...