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-Stay-Lose-Shift, are not prevalent. We also find that the strategies used to support cooperation change with the parameters of the game …. Zudem stellt sich heraus, dass die Strategien, die Kooperation unterstützen sollen, sich mit den Parametern des Spiels …
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A growing experimental literature studies the endogenous choice of institutions to solve cooperation problems arising … of institutional choice. Almost all institutions improve cooperation if they are implemented, but they are not always … identified as important determinants of institutional choice. Cooperation tends to be higher under endogenously chosen …
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We investigate the welfare effect of increasing competition in an anonymous two-sided matching market, where matched pairs play an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Higher matching efficiency is usually considered detrimental as it creates stronger incentives for defection. We point out,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013331070
We investigate the welfare effect of increasing competition in an anonymous two-sided matching market, where matched pairs play an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Higher matching efficiency is usually considered detrimental as it creates stronger incentives for defection. We point out,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014458804
We analyze both theoretically and empirically how monetary incentives and information about others’ behavior affect dishonesty. We run a laboratory experiment with 560 participants, each of whom observes a number from one to six with there being a payoff associated with each number. They can...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012438251
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