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We examine a setting of independent private value auctions where bidders can covertly acquire gradual information about their valuations. We demonstrate that a dynamic pivot mechanism implements the rst-best information acquisition and allocation rule. We apply our results to a commonly used...
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This paper provides a micro-foundation for approximate incentive compatibility using ambiguity aversion. In particular, we propose a novel notion of approximate interim incentive compatibility, approximate local incentive compatibility, and establish an equivalence between approximate local...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014476753
We consider a single object allocation problem with multidimensional signals and interdependent valuations. When agents' signals are statistically independent, Jehiel and Moldovanu [Efficient design with interdependent valuations, Econometrica, 69(5):1237-1259, 2001] show that efficient and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011900076
Auctions are the allocation-mechanisms of choice whenever goods and information in markets are scarce. Therefore, understanding how information affects welfare and revenues in these markets is of fundamental interest. We introduce new statistical concepts, k- and k-m-dispersion, for...
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on actual competition and contract outcomes are ambiguous. We pool a decade of US federal procurement data to shed light …
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consumer surplus. We relate our findings to competition cases in digital markets. …
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