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Over-caution of large committees of experts

Midjord, Rune; Rodríguez Barraquer, Tomás; Valasek, Justin - 2013

We provide an explanation for why committees may behave over-cautiously. A committee of experts makes a decision on a … evidence and the best practices of the experts' common discipline, which is only indirectly related to the true state of the … dieser Innovation durch jeden Experten erfolgt auf der Grundlage dessen, was in der gemeinsamen Disziplin als allgemein …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010195361

Efficient fiscal spending by supranational unions

Simon, Jenny; Valasek, Justin - 2012

We use a novel approach to address the question of whether a union of sovereign countries can efficiently raise and allocate a budget, even when members are purely self-interested and participation is voluntary. The main innovation of our model is to explore the link between budget contributions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009683324

The future of the European fiscal union : survey results from members of national parliaments in France, Italy and Germany

Blesse, Sebastian; Bordignon, Massimo; Boyer, Pierre C.; … - 2021

Using data from a unique survey of members of parliaments in France, Germany and Italy in 2018, we estimate the effects of three dimensions on EU and euro area fiscal reform preferences: nationality, political ideology, and populism. We predict and confirm that a German populist party on the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012596720

The political economy of EU enlargement and the Treaty of Nice

Heinemann, Friedrich - 2000

The paper applies standard public choice reasoning to the negotiations on EU enlargement and the Treaty of Nice. The starting point is the assumption that accession can only be successfully completed if the interests of decisive actors in present EU countries are respected. Decisive actors in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013428342

Trade union membership and influence 1999 - 2009

Bryson, Alex; Forth, John - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008664116

The essential ranking of decision rules in small panels of experts

Karotkin, Drora; Nitsan, Shemuʾel; Paroush, Jacob - 1988

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000783966

Why do people pay for useless advice?

Powdthavee, Nattavudh; Riyanto, Yohanes Eko - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009554805

Credence goods, costly diagnosis, and subjective evaluation

Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - 2014

We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumerś problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010429934

First impressions matter : signalling as a source of policy dynamics

Hansen, Stephen; McMahon, Michael - 2011

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009298215

Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : an experiment on voluntary payments, competition, and reputation in markets for expert services

Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2017

Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011697162

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