This paper studies the causal effect of providing information about climate changeon individuals’ willingness to pay to offset carbon emissions in a randomizedcontrol trial. Receiving truthful information about ways to reduce CO2 emis-sions increases individuals’ willingness to pay for CO2...

This paper shows that agent inattention to taxes generates a time-inconsistency problem in the choice of tax policy. In equilibrium, inattention leads to inefficiently high tax rates and a taxation bias emerges. Combining structural and sufficient statistics approaches, we quantify the magnitude...

This paper studies the causal effect of providing information about climate change on individuals' willingness to pay to offset carbon emissions in a randomized control trial. Receiving truthful information about ways to reduce CO2 emissions increases individuals' willingness to pay for CO2...

We consider a monopolistic certifier selling certification services to a partially privately informed seller. The certifier can enable the seller to disclose her private information publicly, as well as gather additional market information about the good's quality publicly. We show that the...

We study markets for sensitive personal information. An agent wants to communicate with another party but any revealed information can be intercepted and sold to a third party whose reaction harms the agent. The market for information induces an adverse sorting effect, allocating the information...

We study markets for sensitive personal information. An agent wants to communicate with another party but any revealed information can be intercepted and sold to a third party whose reaction harms the agent. The market for information induces an adverse sorting effect, allocating the information...