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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001430456
Nobel for their fundamental contributions to contract theory. This article offers a short summary and discussion of their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011626725
This paper explores the optimal provision of dynamic incentives for employees with reciprocal preferences. Building on the presumption that a relational contract can establish a norm of reciprocity, I show that generous upfront wages that activate an employee’s reciprocal preferences are more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012126237
-only auction (discouraging early information exchange) and bilateral negotiations with a preselected seller (reducing competition …). Bilateral negotiations are superior if potential design improvements are important, if renegotiation is particularly costly, and … if the buyer's bargaining position is strong. Moreover, negotiations provide stronger incentives for sellers to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011596132
of fixed bargaining costs). Augmenting the protocol with unilateral exit options for responding bargainers generally …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013191479
Weitzman (2014) proposed that focusing international climate negotiations on a uniform carbon price is more effective … than Paris style negotiations in achieving ambitious climate action. We put this hypothesis to an experimental test by … simulating international negotiations on climate change in collaboration with Model United Nations associations. This novel …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012500178
a public good. Subjects differ in their benefits and costs of cooperation. Participation in the negotiations and all … negotiated. The success of such negotiations depends on how they are designed. In the context of international climate change …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012500234
We generalize the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model by disentangling payoff delay from bargaining delay. We show that our extension is isomorphic to generalized discounting with dynamic consistency and characterize the unique equilibrium. Using a novel experimental design to control for various...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012266524
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012433528
We provide causal evidence that patience is a significant source of bargaining power. Generalizing the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model to arbitrarily non-stationary discounting, we first show that dynamic consistency across bargaining rounds is sufficient for a unique equilibrium, which we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014279476