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, when motivated agents value the collective reputation of their place of employment, steady-state equilibria with both high … and low aggregate motivation (reputation) in the mission-oriented sector exist. Reforming a low-motivation institution …, but positive for a low-reputation institution, a transition to a high-reputation steady state requires an initial wage …
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In a tedious real effort task, agents can choose to receive information about their piece rate that is either low or ten times higher. One third of subjects deliberately decide to forego this instrumental information, revealing a preference for information avoidance. Strikingly, agents who face...
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