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paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for … acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014478421
Every year during school and college admissions, students and their parents devote considerable time and effort to acquiring costly information about their own preferences. In a market where students are ranked by universities based on exam scores, we explore ways to reduce wasteful information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012500709
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This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012648091
the assortative matching. We compare the preferences of stakeholders who know their own role with agents behind the veil … vote for the assortative matching otherwise. This is in line with the model of Pathak and Sönmez (2008). Subjects behind … the mechanism are split in their vote for the Boston mechanism and the assortative matching. According to the spectators …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012139539
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013347263
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We construct a dynamic model of two-sided sorting in labor markets with multi-dimensional agent and firm heterogeneity. We apply it to study optimal party structure and the decision of how (de)centralized candidate recruitment should be. Parties are non-unitary actors and compete at the local...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014229853
This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012587476
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012594150