We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumerś problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort and...

This paper studies the causal effect of providing information about climate changeon individuals’ willingness to pay to offset carbon emissions in a randomizedcontrol trial. Receiving truthful information about ways to reduce CO2 emis-sions increases individuals’ willingness to pay for CO2...

In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers' productivities from their education choices. In reality, firms also use sophisticated pre-employment auditing to learn workers' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between...

This paper studies the causal effect of providing information about climate change on individuals' willingness to pay to offset carbon emissions in a randomized control trial. Receiving truthful information about ways to reduce CO2 emissions increases individuals' willingness to pay for CO2...

We consider a monopolistic certifier selling certification services to a partially privately informed seller. The certifier can enable the seller to disclose her private information publicly, as well as gather additional market information about the good's quality publicly. We show that the...

This paper delineates the simultaneous impact of non-anticipated information on first and second moments of the intraday price process by including appropriate variables accounting for the news flow into both the mean and the variance function. This allows us to differentiate between the...

We study markets for sensitive personal information. An agent wants to communicate with another party but any revealed information can be intercepted and sold to a third party whose reaction harms the agent. The market for information induces an adverse sorting effect, allocating the information...